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Abstract-I In this paper, a cognitive relay channel is consid­
ered, and amplify-and-forward (AF) relay beam forming designs 
in the presence of an eavesdropper and a primary user are 
studied. Our objective is to optimize the performance of the 
cognitive relay beamforming system while limiting the interfer­
ence in the direction of the primary receiver and keeping the 
transmitted signal secret from the eavesdropper. We show that 
under both total and individual power constraints, the problem 
becomes a quasiconvex optimization problem which can be solved 
by interior point methods. We also propose two sub-optimal 
null space beamforming schemes which are obtained in a more 
computationally efficient way. 
Index Terms: Amplify-and-forward relaying, cognitive radio, 
physical-layer security, relay beamforming. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The need for the efficient use of the scarce spectrum in 
wireless applications has led to significant interest in the 
analysis of cognitive radio systems. One possible scheme 
for the operation of the cognitive radio network is to allow 
the secondary users to transmit concurrently on the same 
frequency band with the primary users as long as the resulting 
interference power at the primary receivers is kept below the 
interference temperature limit [1]. Note that interference to 
the primary users is caused due to the broadcast nature of 
wireless transmissions, which allows the signals to be received 
by all users within the communication range. Note further 
that this broadcast nature also makes wireless communica­
tions vulnerable to eavesdropping. The problem of secure 
transmission in the presence of an eavesdropper was first 
studied from an information-theoretic perspective in [2] where 
Wyner considered a wiretap channel model. In [2], the secrecy 
capacity is defined as the maximum achievable rate from the 
transmitter to the legitimate receiver, which can be attained 
while keeping the eavesdropper completely ignorant of the 
transmitted messages. Later, Wyner's result was extended 
to the Gaussian channel in [4]. Recently, motivated by the 
importance of security in wireless applications, information­
theoretic security has been investigated in fading multi-antenna 
and multiuser channels. For instance, cooperative relaying 
under secrecy constraints was studied in [9]-[11]. In [11], for 
amplify and forwad relaying scheme, not having analytical 
solutions for the optimal beamforming design under both 
total and individual power constraints, an iterative algorithm 
I This work was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants 
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is proposed to numerically obtain the optimal beamforming 
structure and maximize the secrecy rates. 
Although cognitive radio networks are also susceptible to 
eavesdropping, the combination of cognitive radio channels 
and information-theoretic security has received little attention. 
Very recently, Pei et al. in [12] studied secure communi­
cation over multiple input, single output (MISO) cognitive 
radio channels. In this work, finding the secrecy-capacity­
achieving transmit covariance matrix under joint transmit and 
interference power constraints is formulated as a quasiconvex 
optimization problem. 
In this paper, we investigate the collaborative relay beam­
forming under secrecy constraints in the cognitive radio net­
work. We first characterize the secrecy rate of the amplify­
and-forward (AF) cognitive relay channel. Then, we formulate 
the beamforming optimization as a quasiconvex optimization 
problem which can be solved through convex semidefinite pro­
gramming (SDP). Furthermore, we propose two sub-optimal 
null space beamforming schemes to reduce the computational 
complexity. 
II. CHANNEL MODEL 
We consider a cognitive relay channel with a secondary user 
source S, a primary user P, a secondary user destination D, 
an eavesdropper E, and M relays {Rm}�=l' as depicted in 
Figure 1. We assume that there is no direct link between S 
and D, Sand P, and Sand E. We also assume that relays 
work synchronously to perform beamforming by multiplying 
the signals to be transmitted with complex weights {wm}. We 
denote the channel fading coefficient between S and Rm by 
gm E C, the fading coefficient between Rm and D by hm E C, 
Rm and P by km E C and the fading coefficient between 
Rm and E by Zm E C. In this model, the source S tries 
to transmit confidential messages to D with the help of the 
relays on the same band as the primary user's while keeping 
the interference on the primary user below some predefined 
interference temperature limit and keeping the eavesdropper E 
ignorant of the information. It's obvious that our channel is a 
two-hop relay network. In the first hop, the source S transmits 
Xs to relays with power E[lxsI2] = Ps. The received signal at 
the mth relay Rm is given by 
Yr,m = gmxs + 'fJm (1) 
2011 45th Annual Conference on Information Sciences and Systems (CISS), doi: 10.1109/CISS.2011.5766188 
Fig. !. Channel Model 
where TIm is the background noise that has a Gaussian distri­
bution with zero mean and variance of Nm. 
In the AF scenario, the received signal at Rm is directly 
multiplied by lmwm without decoding, and forwarded to D. 
The relay output can be written as 
Xr,m = wmlm(9mXs + TIm). (2) 
The scaling factor, 
(3) 
is used to ensure E[lxr,mI2] = Iwml2. There are two kinds of 
power constraints for relays. First one is a total relay power 
constraint in the following form: IIwl12 = wtw ::::: PT where 
w = [WI, ... WM]T and PT is the maximum total power. 
(-)T and (-) t denote the transpose and conjugate transpose, 
respectively, of a matrix or vector. In a multiuser network such 
as the relay system we study in this paper, it is practically more 
relevant to consider individual power constraints as wireless 
nodes generally operate under such limitations. Motivated by 
this, we can impose Iwml2 ::::: PmVm or equivalently Iwl2 ::::: p 
where 1 . 12 denotes the element-wise norm-square operation 
and p is a column vector that contains the components {Pm}. 
Pm is the maximum power for the mth relay node. 
The received signals at the destination D and eavesdropper 
E are the superposition of the messages sent by the relays. 
These received signals are expressed, respectively, as 
M 
Yd = L hmwmlm(9mXs + TIm) + no, and 
m=1 
M 
Ye = L zmwmlm(9mXs + TIm) + nl 
m=1 
(4) 
(5) 
where no and nl are the Gaussian background noise com­
ponents with zero mean and variance No, at D and E, 
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respectively. It is easy to compute the received SNR at D 
and E as 
r _ 1 L�=I hm9mlmwml2ps d -
L�=llhmI2l;,lwmI2Nm + No' 
r = 1 L�=I Zm9mlmwml2 Ps e 
L�=llzmI2l;,lwmI2Nm+No' 
The secrecy rate is now given by 
Rs = I(xs; Yd) - I(xs; Ye) 
= 10g(1 + r d) - 10g(1 + r e ) 
= 10 (L�=I IZml2l;'lwml2 Nm + No X g 
L�=I Ihml2l;,lwml2Nm + No 
and (6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
1 L�=I hm9mlmwml2 Ps + L�=llhmI2l;'IWmI2 Nm + No) 
1 L�=I Zm9mlmwml2Ps + L�=I IZmI2l;,IWmI2Nm + No 
(10) 
where 1(·;·) denotes the mutual information. The interference 
at the primary user is 
M M 
A = 1 L km9mlmwml2 Ps + L Ikml2l;'lwml2 Nm· (11) 
m=1 m=1 
In this paper, under the assumption that the relays have 
perfect channel side information (CSI), we address the joint 
optimization of {wm} and hence identify the optimum col­
laborative relay beamforming (CRB) direction that maximizes 
the secrecy rate in (10) while maintaining the interference on 
the primary user under a certain threshold, i.e,. A ::::: 'Y, where 
'Y is the interference temperature limit. 
III. OPTIMAL BEAMFORMING 
Let us define 
hg = [hi9iit, ... , hM9MlM]T, (12) 
hz = [Zi9ill' ... , ZM9MlM]
T, (13) 
hk = [ki9iit, ... , kM9MlMf, (14) 
Dh = Diag(lhI12liNI, ... , IhMI2lXaNM), (15) 
Dz = Diag(lzI12liNI, ... , IZMI2lXaNM), and (16) 
Dk = Diag(lkl12li NI, ... , IkMI2lXaN M) (17) 
where superscript * denotes conjugate operation. Then, the 
received SNR at the destination and eavesdropper, and the 
interference on primary user can be written, respectively, as 
rd = 
Pswthghgtw 
wtDhW+No' 
r _ Pswthzhztw e - wtDzw+No' 
A = Pswthkhktw + wtDkW. 
(18) 
(19) 
(20) 
With these notations, we can write the objective function of 
the optimization problem (i.e., the term inside the logarithm 
in (10» as 
l+
r
e l+Pswthzhztw wtDzw+No 
wtDhw+No+Pswthghgtw wtDzw+No 
( ) --��--�--�--���x 21 wtDzw + No + Pswthzhztw wtDhw + No 
No + tr((Dh + Pshghg t)wwt) No + tr(Dzwwt) 
- x �----��--� 
No + tr((Dz + Pshzhz t)wwt) No + tr(Dh wwt) · 
No+tr((Dh+Pshghgt)wwt) t No+tr((Dz+Pshzhz t)wwt) , 2 
No+tr(Dzwwt) d fi X A t d I th ·d f No+tr(Dhwwt)' e ne = ww ,an emp oy e semI e -
inite relaxation approach, we can express the beamforming 
optimization problem as 
If we denote tl 
A. Beamforming in the Null Space of Eavesdropper's Channel 
(BNE) 
We choose w to lie in the null space of hz. With this as­
sumption, we eliminate E's capability of eavesdropping on D. 
Mathematically, this is equivalent to I L�=l Zm9mlmwm 12 = 
1hz t wl2 = 0, which means w is in the null space of hz t. We 
can write w = H;v, where H; denotes the projection matrix 
onto the null space of hz t. Specifically, the columns of H; 
are orthonormal vectors which form the basis of the null space 
of hz t. In our case, H; is an M x (M - 1) matrix. The total 
power constraint becomes wtw = vtH;tH;v = vtv:S PT. 
The individual power constraint becomes IH;vI2 :S p 
Under the above null space beamforming assumption, 
r 
e is 
zero. Hence, we only need to maximize 
r 
d to get the highest 
achievable secrecy rate. 
r 
d is now expressed as 
s.t tr (X (Dh + Pshghgt - it (Dz + Pshzhzt))) � No(it - 1) 
r PsvtH;thghgtH;v d = 
vtHt tDhHtv + No 
. (23) 
tr (X (Dz - t2Dh)) � No(t2 - 1) 
tr (X (Dk + Pshkhkt)) :S 'Y 
and dia9(X):S p, (andj or tr(X):S PT) and X t O. 
(22) 
The optimization problem here is similar to that in [11]. The 
only difference is that we have an additional constraint due 
to the interference limitation. Thus, we can use the same 
optimization framework. The optimal beamforming solution 
that maximizes the secrecy rate in the cognitive relay channel 
can be obtained by using semidefinite programming with a 
two dimensional search for both total and individual power 
constraints. For simulation, one can use the well-developed 
interior point method based package SeDuMi [14], which 
produces a feasibility certificate if the problem is feasible, 
and its popular interface Yalmip [15]. It is important to note 
that we should have the optimal X to be of rank-one to 
determine the beamforming vector. While proving analytically 
the existence of a rank-one solution for the above optimization 
problem seems to be a difficult task2, we would like to 
emphasize that the solutions are rank-one in our simulations. 
Thus, our numerical result are tight. Also, even in the case we 
encounter a solution with rank higher than one, the Gaussian 
randomization technique is practically proven to be effective 
in finding a feasible, rank-one approximate solution of the 
original problem. Details can be found in [8]. 
IV. SUB-OPTIMAL NULL SPACE BEAMFORMING 
Obtaining the optimal solution requires significant compu­
tation. To simplify the analysis, we propose suboptimal null 
space beamforming techniques in this section . 
2Since we in general have more than two linear constraints depending on the 
number of relay nodes and since we cannot assume that we have channels 
with real and positive coefficients, the techniques that are used in several 
studies to prove the existence of a rank-one solution (see e.g., [5], [8],and 
references therein) are not directly applicable to our setting. 
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The interference on the primary user can be written as 
(24) 
Defining X � vv, we can express the optimization problem 
as 
max t X,t 
s.t tr (X (PsH; t hghg tH; - tH; t DhH; )) � Not 
tr (X (H; t DkH; + PsH; t hkhk tH; )) :S 'Y 
and diag(H;XH;t):S p,(andjor tr(X):S PT) and XtO. 
(25) 
This problem can be easily solved by semidefinite program­
ming with bisection search [10]. 
B. Beamforming in the Null Space of Eavesdropper's and 
Primary User's Channels (BNEP) 
In this section, we choose w to lie in the null space 
of hz and hk. Mathematically, this is equivalent to re­
quiring I L�=l Zm9mlmwml2 = Ihztwl2 = 0, and 
I L�=l km9mlmwml2 = Ihktwl2 = o. We can write w = 
H;kv, where H;k denotes the projection matrix onto the 
nuli space of hz t �d hk t. Specifically, the columns of H; k 
are orthonormal vectors which form the basis of the null spac�. 
In our case, H;k is an M x (M - 2) matrix. The total power 
constraint beco:Ues wtw = vtH;/H;kV = vtv :S PT. 
The individual power constraint be�omes 'IH;'k vl2 :S p. 
With this beamforming strategy, we again have 
r 
e = O. 
Moreover, the interference on the primary user is now reduced 
to 
M 
A = L Ikml2l;,lwml2 Nm = vtH;'k t DkH;'k v (26) 
m=l 
which is the sum of the forwarded additive noise components 
present at the relays. Now, the optimization problem becomes 
max t X,t 
s.t tr (x (PsH;'k t hghg tH;'k - tH;'k t DhH;'k)) � Not 
tr (X (H;,/ DkH;'k)) 5:. 'Y 
and diag(H;'kXH;,/) 5:. p, (and/or tr(X) 5:. PT) 
and X t O. 
(27) 
Again, this problem can be solved through semidefinite pro­
gramming. With the following assumptions, we can also obtain 
a closed-form characterization of the beamforming structure. 
Since the interference experienced by the primary user consists 
of the forwarded noise components, we can assume that the 
interference constraint A 5:. 'Y is inactive unless 'Y is very small. 
With this assumption, we can drop this constraint. If we further 
assume that the relays operate under the total power constraint 
expressed as vt v 5:. PT, we can get the following closed-form 
solution: 
max fd 
vtv:'Op, 
PsvtH;-k thghg tH;'k v 
= max 
------�, '���--�� 
vtv:'Op, vtH� TDhH� v + No z,k z,k 
PsvtH;-k thghg tH;-k v 
= max ' , 
vtv:'OP, vt (H� tDhH� + �I) v z,k z,k Pr 
( � t t � � tD � No I) = PsAmax Hz,k hghg Hz,k, Hz,k hHz,k + PT 
where Amax(A, B) is the largest generalized eigenvalue 
of the matrix pair (A, B) 3. Hence, the maximum se­
crecy rate is achieved by the beamforming vector Vopt = 
<;u where u is the eigenvector that corresponds to 
Amax (H;-thghgtH;-,H;-tDhH;- + ;�I) and <; is chosen 
to ensure V�Pt Vopt = PT. 
V. MULTIPLE PRIMARY USERS AND EAVESDROPPERS 
The discussion in Section III can be easily extended to 
the case of more than one primary user in the network. 
Each primary user will introduce an interference constraint 
f i 5:. 'Yi which can be straightforwardly included into (22). 
The beamforming optimization is still a semidefinite pro­
gramming problem. On the other hand, the results in Section 
III cannot be easily extended to the multiple-eavesdropper 
scenario. In this case, the secrecy rate for AF relaying is 
Rs = J(xs; Yd) - maXi J(xs; Ye,i), where the maximization 
is over the rates achieved over the links between the relays 
and different eavesdroppers. Hence, we have to consider the 
eavesdropper with the strongest channel. In this scenario, the 
objective function cannot be expressed in the form given in 
3For a Hermitian matrix A E cnxn and positive definite matrix B E 
cnxn, (A, 'Ij;) is referred to as a generalized eigenvalue - eigenvector pair of 
(A, B) if (A, 'Ij;) satisty A'Ij; = AB'Ij; [13], 
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(10) and the optimization framework provided in Section III 
does not directly apply to the multi-eavesdropper model. 
However, the null space beam forming schemes discussed in 
Section IV can be extended to the case of multiple primary 
users and eavesdroppers under the condition that the number of 
relay nodes is greater than the number of eavesdroppers or the 
total number of eavesdroppers and primary users depending 
on which null space beam forming is used. The reason for this 
condition is to make sure the projection matrix H � exists. 
Note that the null space of i channels in general has the 
dimension M x (M - i) where M is the number of relays. 
V I. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We assume that {9m}, {hm}, {zm}, {km} are complex, 
circularly symmetric Gaussian random variables with zero 
mean and variances 0'; , O'�, 0'; and O'� respectively. In this 
section, each figure is plotted for fixed realizations of the 
Gaussian channel coefficients. Hence, the secrecy rates in the 
plots are instantaneous secrecy rates. 
In Fig. 2, we plot the optimal secrecy rates for the amplify­
and-forward collaborative relay beamforming system under 
both individual and total power constraints. We also pro­
vide, for comparison, the secrecy rates attained by using 
the suboptimal beam forming schemes. The fixed parameters 
are O'g = 10,O'h = 1,O'z = 1,O'k = 1, 'Y = OdE, and 
M = 10. Since AF secrecy rates depend on both the source 
and relay powers, the rate curves are plotted as a function 
of PT / Ps. We assume that the relays have equal powers in 
the case in which individual power constraints are imposed, 
i.e., Pi = PT/M. It is immediately seen from the figure 
that the suboptimal null space beam forming achievable rates 
under both total and individual power constraints are very 
close to the corresponding optimal ones. Especially, they are 
nearly identical in the high SNR regime, which suggests that 
null space beam forming is optimal at high SNRs. Thus, null 
space beam forming schemes are good alternatives as they 
o 
.c 
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are obtained with much less computational burden. Moreover, 
we interestingly observe that imposing individual relay power 
constraints leads to small losses in the secrecy rates. 
In Fig. 3, we change the parameters to (J9 = 10, (Jh = 
1, (Jz = 2, (Jk = 4, 'Y = 10dB and M = 10. In this case, 
channels between the relays and the eavesdropper and between 
the relays and the primary-user are on average stronger than 
the channels between the relays and the destination. We note 
that beamforming schemes can still attain good performance 
and we observe similar trends as before. 
In Fig. 4, we plot the optimal secrecy rate and the se­
crecy rates of the two sUboptimal null space beamforming 
schemes (under both total and individual power constraints) 
as a function of the interference temperature limit 'Y. We 
assume that PT = Ps = OdB. It is observed that the secrecy 
5 
rate achieved by beam forming in the null space of both the 
eavesdropper's and primary user's channels (BNEP) is almost 
insensitive to different interference temperature limits when 
'Y 2: -4dB since it always forces the signal interference to 
be zero regardless of the value of 'Y. It is further observed 
that beam forming in the null space of the eavesdropper's 
channel (BNE) always achieves near optimal performance 
regardless the value of'Y under both total and individual power 
constraints. 
V II. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, collaborative relay beamforming in cognitive 
radio networks is studied under secrecy constraints. Optimal 
beamforming designs that maximize secrecy rates are investi­
gated under both total and individual relay power constraints. 
We have formulated the problem as a semidefinite program­
ming problem and provided an optimization framework. In 
addition, we have proposed two sub-optimal null space beam­
forming schemes to simplify the computation. Finally, we have 
provided numerical results to illustrate the performances of 
different beamforming schemes. 
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